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Politics: Louis XV 
Julian Swann 
According to pope Benedict XIV there was no greater proof for the 
existence of providence than to see France prosper under the rule of 
Louis XV. Few were as gentle or ironic as the pontiff in their assess- 
ment of the lung. For the duke de Choiseul, who was the linchpin of 
his government for more than a decade (1758-70), Louis XV was 
'soulless' with the mind of a 'spiteful child'. Worse still 'he would, like 
Nero, have been enchanted to watch Paris burn . . . but lacked the 
courage to give the order." In the popular memory, the king is famous 
for uttering the phrase 'after me the deluge', which, while almost 
certainly apocryphal, conjures up an image of a monarch intelligent 
enough to foresee the tragedy of 1789, but too lazy to do anything 
about it. Napoleon, on the other hand, once declared that he 'found 
the crown of France in the mud' and many have assumed that it was 
Louis XV who let it drop. Mme de Pompadour was only the most 
important of a string of mistresses, many of whom were little more 
than girls housed in the Parc aux cerfs ('deer park') in circumstances 
reminiscent of a brothel. Finally in 1769, the ageing monarch scan- 
dalized his subjects by falling for the charms of Mme du Barry, a 
courtesan of ill-repute, who was installed in Versailles as his official 
companion. With such a record, Louis XV has, not surprisingly, been 
represented as the embodiment of vice, the very incarnation of the 
abuses allegedly rotting the core of the old regime. It may therefore 
come as a surprise to learn of the existence of another very different 
interpretation of his reign. There is a venerable school of historical 
scholarship which maintains that in his later years the lung threw off 
his lethargy, sponsoring reforms capable of saving the monarchy had 
' J. P. Guicciadini and P. Bonnet (eds.) Mimoires du Duc de Choiseul (Paris, 1983), 192. 
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not a premature death cut short the experiment. That the historical 
reputation of Louis XV remains so contentious says much about both 
the troubled personality of the king and the long-term significance of 
his reign. 
The regency, I 7 I 5-1 723 
Popular rejoicing greeted the news of the sun king's passing, but for a 
perceptive observer any sense of relief was liable to be tinged with 
apprehension. His successor was a child of 5 and previous royal 
minorities had been blighted by civil war. With the government close 
to bankruptcy, it would require a regent endowed with ability and 
luck to avoid a repetition. As the king was an orphan, it was the senior 
prince of the blood, his uncle Philippe duke d'orleans, who would 
act as regent. Affable, intelligent, and a talented general, the regent 
was also a libertine and a rake who had fallen foul of the starchy 
atmosphere of Versailles during Louis XIV's twilight years. His 
unorthodox lifestyle even gave birth to vicious rumours accusing him 
of poisoning his relatives when tragedy struck the royal family in 
1711-12. The old king treated these slurs with the contempt they 
deserved, but he never accorded Orlkans his total confidence. Just 
prior to his death, Louis XIV drew up a secret will limiting the power 
of Orlkans as regent while promoting that of his bastard sons, the 
duke du Maine and the count de Toulouse. His actions have been 
interpreted as a sop to Mme de Maintenon, permissible on the 
grounds that the wishes of a dead monarch were not binding on his 
successors. It is true that a similar testament written by Louis XI11 
had been ignored, but there was no guarantee that history would 
repeat itself. 
In defusing the crisis, Orleans displayed his political flair. Hours 
after the king's death, he announced that a bed of justice would be 
held the next day, 2 September 1715, for the formal declaration of the 
regency. Rather than take chances, Orleans struck a deal with leading 
parlementaires by promising to restore their right of remonstrance 
before the registration of laws in return for annulling the will. When 
combined with the conspicuous deployment of troops and liberal 
dispensation of patronage to the other princes and Court grandees it 
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was enough to ensure victory. The parlement of Paris, with the 
princes and the peers assembled, overturned Louis XIV's testament, 
recognizing instead the right of Orleans to the full title and powers 
of regent. Many years later a frustrated Louis XV bitterly reproached 
the regent's grandson, blaming Orleans for his difficulties with the 
parlements. It was an unjust reprimand. In 1715, after more than 
twenty sombre years of war, France was seething with discontent. 
The decision to undo Louis XIV's legislation of 1673 restricting the 
right of remonstrance was sensible and perceptive. It opened an 
important safety valve and won Orlians vital allies at a crucial 
moment. 
The regent was equally dextrous in his handling of the grandees. 
The aristocratic thinkers of the Burgundy circle had been critical of 
Louis XIV's 'ministerial despotism' and in addition to their hopes of 
restoring the old nobility to political power had been discussing the 
summoning of an estates general. Orleans defused the threat with 
aplomb. He informed the grandees of their appointment to key posi- 
tions on a series of seven new councils that became collectively 
known as the polysynodie. The councils, which included foreign 
affairs, finance, and the navy were not executive organs. They merely 
acted as discussion chambers, preparing reports and recommenda- 
tions for the regency council where real power lay. Not surprisingly, 
initial enthusiasm soon waned and in 1718 they were abolished with- 
out dissent. Yet polysynodie had more than served its purpose by 
bringing potentially disruptive groups into government while the 
regent consolidated his grip on power. 
An ability to balance the competing interests of the court factions 
was one of the regent's most telling assets, and he succeeded in per- 
suading the powerful that cooperation with his government was 
more lucrative than opposition. The truth of this maxim was demon- 
strated by the treatment of the defeated bastards. In July 1717, the 
regent overturned Louis XIV's edict placing them in succession to the 
throne. A year later they were stripped of their 'royal' status and 
demoted to the level of peers. Orleans was generous in victory and 
Toulouse remained a trusted adviser on naval matters. Maine, on the 
other hand, was drawn into plotting against the regent with the Span- 
ish ambassador, Cellamare. When the conspiracy was discovered, 
Maine, together with his equally compromised wife, was imprisoned 
in the Bastille. 
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As the struggle with the bastards demonstrated, the French succes- 
sion had been in the balance since 1712 and Orleans had to tread 
carefully. If Louis XV succumbed to one of the all too prevalent 
childhood illnesses Europe faced a grave international crisis. Accord- 
ing to the Salic law-one of the fabled fundamental laws of the 
kingdom-the crown passed to Philip V of Spain. The fear of a king 
reigning in both Madrid and Versailles had made his renunciation of 
the French throne one of the principal clauses of the peace of Utrecht. 
If the treaty was upheld, the crown passed to Orleans, an outcome 
with obvious attractions to the British and Dutch governments. Some 
historians have therefore been critical of the regent's foreign policy 
because of its emphasis upon an entente with the maritime 
powers consummated by the signing of the Triple alliance in 1717. 
The target of the new allies was Philip V who had launched a crusade 
to recapture Spanish possessions in Italy lost at Utrecht. Nothing 
revealed the new diplomatic order better than the sight of French 
troops marching into Spain in order to check him. 
Yet the regent's diplomacy was not part of a cunning plan to 
advance the interests of the House of Orleans. France needed peace, 
not a quixotic expression of Bourbon family solidarity that would 
have almost certainly resulted in war with Austria and the maritime 
powers. Had Louis XV died then even the closest admirers of the 
regent realized that Philip V would be king. The most Orleans could 
hope for was to replace him in Madrid. The support of the maritime 
powers would be a huge advantage in these circumstances as all sides 
realized. However, if the regent occasionally dreamed of life in the 
Escorial, there is no evidence that he allowed his personal interests to 
conflict with those of Louis XV. 
With peace abroad, Orlkans was free to concentrate upon internal 
problems. The most pressing was a truly astronomical state debt of 
some 2,000 million livres. Following the precedent set by Colbert and 
Louis XIV, he established a chamber of justice in 1716 to investigate 
the excess profits allegedly extorted by the financiers during the wars. 
The substantial sum of 220 million Zivres was raised, but it was still 
only a drop in the ocean of state debt. The chamber did, however, 
please the magistrates who served on it and the public who saw these 
despised 'fat cats' get their just deserts. Although welcome, something 
more substantial than a public relations triumph was required, espe- 
cially after the tenth tax lapsed in 1717. It was in these circumstances 
POLITICS: LOUIS XV 1 199 
that the regent displayed the unconventional side to his character by 
placing his confidence in the Scottish adventurer, John Law. 
In a meteoric career, Law rose from obscurity to a brief and event- 
ful dominance of the kingdom's financial affairs. With official 
encouragement, he established a private bank in 1716 and began to 
issue bank notes. These were subsequently accepted as legal tender, 
and the phenomenal success of the enterprise persuaded the regent to 
accept its conversion into a state bank in December 1718. With 
external peace and strong demographic and economic growth, the 
moment was propitious for such an experiment. As the paper cur- 
rency began to circulate it gave an inflationary boost to the economy 
and, as Law intended, interest rates fell. He then turned his atten- 
tion to the second major plank of his scheme, the creation of a 
monopoly trading company- the Mississippi company-financed by 
his bank. An already grandiose project was rendered even more 
imposing by the acquisition of the rights of the general farm and the 
tobacco monopoly. To crown the edifice, the bank also took over 
responsibility for state debt. 
Law was clearly seeking to emulate the banking and commercial 
ventures of the English and the Dutch. Unfortunately for France, his 
scheme was overambitious and his economic analysis riddled with 
flaws. Convinced of the benefits to be gained from the increased 
circulation of money, he printed ever larger numbers of bank notes, 
quickly outstripping the productive capacity of the economy. Nor was 
he helped by the regent's proclivity for scattering the company's 
shares like confetti as part of his constant battle to keep the Court 
grandees on his side. A speculative frenzy, soon followed by rampant 
inflation was the predictable result with company shares reaching 
dizzy heights on unsubstantiated rumours that the Mississippi delta 
would be Louis XV's El Dorado. 
Here alone were enough reasons for the project to falter and there 
were plenty of political obstacles to add to the equation. By promot- 
ing Law, the regent alienated the Court bankers and farmers-general 
as well as the head of the council of finance, the influential duke de 
Noailles. The parlement also raised its voice against Law's untested 
schemes and was exiled to Pontoise for its pains. Yet despite desperate 
efforts to shore up the bank's credit, the speculative bubble burst in 
May 1720. For those perceptive enough to convert their paper into 
more tangible assets before the crash, the scheme brought fabulous 
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profits. Similarly those individuals or institutions that had been able 
to repay debt with inflated notes had reason to thank Law. The state 
itself had prospered in this fashion, reducing its debt substantially in 
the process. Of course, for every beneficiary of Law's system there 
were countless victims left holding a currency not worth the paper it 
was printed on. As a result, he has been blamed for the monarchy's 
subsequent inability to establish a state bank. In reality, the problem 
was more profound. Years of broken promises and fiscal expediency 
had created a perfectly legitimate suspicion of the crown's fiscal 
operations. Without public accountability, hopes of transplanting 
English or Dutch banking practice to French soil were doomed 
to failure. Once Law was exiled, French financial administration 
continued as before. 
Religious divisions posed a no less perplexing problem for the 
regent. The bull Unigenitus condemning Jansenism was a poisonous 
gift from Louis XIV that had damaging repercussions throughout the 
reign of his successor. A religious sceptic, and by nature a conciliator, 
Orleans sought a compromise. Influential opponents of the bull, such 
as the archbishop of Paris, cardinal de Noailles, and the parlementaire 
priest Pucelle, were invited to sit on the council of conscience. 
Meanwhile pope Clement XI was approached in an ultimately vain 
attempt to persuade him to clarify disputed aspects of Unigenitus. 
What undermined the pursuit of peace in the church was the depth 
of religious feeling on both sides. In April 1717, over 3,000 clerics, 
including Noailles, and a majority of the theological faculty of the 
Sorbonne, appealed against Unigenitus to a general council of the 
church. Nothing was more certain to light the blue touch paper in 
Rome, and in September 1718 an outraged pope unleashed a rocket in 
the form of the encyclical, Pastoralis Oficii, which excommunicated 
the appellants. He found staunch supporters in the French church, 
known as the constitutionnaires, who called for unequivocal accept- 
ance of the 'constitution', as the bull was known. In sermons, pastoral 
letters, and polemical pamphlets the theological storm raged and 
with his policy of conciliation in tatters, the regent changed tack. In 
August 1720, he issued a declaration imposing silence on all disputes 
arising from Unigenitus and acted firmly against those who dis- 
obeyed. It was not a permanent solution, but the regent was spared 
further frustration by his premature death in December 1723. He had 
finally paid the price for a life of epic overindulgence. Yet Orleans 
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deserves to be remembered as something more than a rake. Thanks to 
his equanimity and good sense, he had given France the most 
trouble-free regency in its history. 
The 'golden age' of Fleury 
Although Louis XV was crowned at Reims in October 1722, he was 
only just entering his teens and with the regent's death power passed 
to the duke de Bourbon. His brief ministry is primarily remembered 
for his decision to marry the king to Maria Leszczynska, daughter of 
the dethroned king of Poland, and it ended abruptly in December 
1725 with the duke's exile to his chateau at Chantilly. His disgrace was 
the first independent act of the young king, who replaced him with 
his tutor, cardinal Andrk-Hercule de Fleury. Orphaned at the age of 2, 
king of France and focus of the attendant regal and courtly para- 
phernalia at 5 ,  Louis XV suffered a traumatic childhood that left him 
inclined to shyness, fatalism, and melancholy. The grandfatherly 
Fleury, already a venerable 73 in 1726, was an indispensable source of 
emotional support for his royal charge and Bourbon had made the 
mistake of trying to separate them. He was not alone in underestimat- 
ing Fleury, who was commonly believed to be too old or unambitious 
to turn his hold over the king to advantage. It was a grave mistake 
because once in power he was almost impossible to dislodge. Acting 
as first minister, the cardinal directed the affairs of France for the next 
seventeen years. He had the complete confidence of Louis XV, and he 
kept a sharp eye on the activities of the secretaries of state by sitting 
in on their meetings with the king. Any minister unfortunate or 
foolhardy enough to cross Fleury risked dismissal, as the talented 
Chauvelin discovered to his cost in 1737. 
In his approach to international politics, Fleury was generally 
pacific. Llke the regent, he viewed the English alliance as the basis for 
European stability. Although the alliance between the two powers 
lapsed after 1731, they were able to maintain a mutually beneficial 
dktente. France was thus free from the threat of hostile European 
coalitions that had brought her so close to defeat between 1689 and 
1713. When war did break out over the disputed Polish succession in 
1733, Fleury was able to draw maximum advantage. 
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The death of Augustus I1 provided the opportunity for the deposed 
Stanislas Leszczynski, now the father-in-law of Louis XV, to reclaim 
the throne. Poland formed part of France's traditional stable of 
secondary powers subsidized in order to threaten the flanks of 
Austria. If Stanislas could be re-established in Warsaw, it would be a 
major diplomatic coup, and would silence slanderous tongues who 
mocked the marriage of Louis W and a minor Polish princess. What 
prevented this happy outcome was the intervention of Russia. Since 
Peter 1's victory in the Great Northern War, Poland had been reduced 
to the level of a Russian protectorate. Empress Anna had no desire to 
see that position reversed, and she backed the rival candidacy of 
Augustus 111 of Saxony. With Russian aid, he soon worsted Stanislas, 
who took refuge in the port of Danzig. Fleury, who was astute enough 
to realize the futility of waging war in such circumstances, did no 
more than send a token force in an abortiveeattempt to relieve him. 
Instead, the war was fought against Russia's ally, Austria, in the trad- 
itional theatres of Germany and Italy. Helped by a renewed alliance 
with Spain, France won a series of rapid victories, forcing the 
emperor Charles V1 to sue for peace. The defeated Stanislas was com- 
pensated with the duchy of Lorraine. It was a triumph for Fleury. An 
intendant arrived to administer the duchy, which became officially 
part of France on the death of Stanislas in 1766. There were other 
gains for the Bourbons in Italy, and the only cost to France was 
recognition of the pragmatic sanction, naming Maria Theresa, 
daughter of Charles VI, as sole heir to the Habsburg hereditary lands. 
One short, successful war was the only interruption in an other- 
wise peaceful generation. Without needing to implement drastic 
reforms, the government was able to repair much of the damage 
inflicted by Louis XIV. The controllers-general, Dodun (1722-6) and, 
especially, Orry (1730-45), restored balance to government finances 
that were showing a modest annual surplus by the late 1730s. No less 
impressive was the stabilization of the French currency, the livre 
tournois, which after 1726 was no longer subject to manipulation by 
the crown. The development of a modern road network, which was 
one of the great ornaments of the age of Louis W, also gathered 
pace under Fleury. Thanks to the painstaking efforts of chancellor 
d7Aguesseau, progress was made in judicial reform, primarily by iron- 
ing out inconsistencies in civil law. These were worthy achievements, 
but it has to be said that the cardinal's administration was profoundly 
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conservative. With France still basking in her reputation as the 
continent's foremost military power a certain complacency was 
understandable, and while the ministry tinkered with the edges of the 
existing system, it never contemplated radical change. 
Fleury's rule was therefore a period of relative calm. What stopped 
it from becoming soporific was the continuing furore surrounding 
Unigenitus. The regent's efforts to impose silence on clerical bicker- 
ing had failed and the row continued with a powerful and influential 
group of bishops claiming that complete submission to the 'constitu- 
tion' was essential for salvation. A small, but no less fervent number 
believed the very opposite and they were backed by a more substan- 
tial body of opinion in the parish clergy. An unshakeable faith in the 
righteousness of their cause was the inspiration for Jansenists 
throughout the eighteenth century. As a minority within the church, 
they might have been nothing more than a nuisance were it not for 
the fact that the opposition to Unigenitus was fed from other streams. 
Most significantly, the bull offended those in the church and 
especially the parlements who were loyal to the Gallican tradition. 
The four articles promulgated by Louis XIV in 1682 had given legal 
expression to the widely held belief that the French church had rights 
and liberties independent of Rome. Unigenitus, with its clumsy 
phraseology, most strikingly in the notorious article 91 in which the 
pope reserved the theoretical right to excommunicate the king, chal- 
lenged those principles and only Louis XIV's threats and coercion 
had persuaded the magistrates to register the bull. After his death, 
they were much less malleable and any alteration to its status risked 
provoking opposition. 
Fleury had personally accepted Unigenitus without demur. He 
was not, however, a religious bigot. Like many others, he believed 
Jansenism to be a danger to church unity and acted accordingly. His 
strategy was to starve the movement of leadership, much as Louis 
XI11 and Louis XIV had done with the Huguenots. Constant pressure 
was exerted upon leading appellants, notably cardinal de NoaiIIes, 
with the aim of persuading them to accept the bull. Noailles spent 
more than a decade grappling with his conscience before finally 
capitulating in 1728. Other outspoken critics of Unigenitus were exiled 
to distant seminaries and, in the case of Soanen, bishop of Senez, 
deposed. Thereafter Fleury used his control of ecclesiastical prefer- 
ments to ensure that only those of orthodox, preferably moderate 
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opinions were promoted. Finally, he sought, not altogether success- 
fully, to suppress the publication of sermons and theological tracts 
that had done so much to fan the flames of controversy. 
As these measures began to bite, the cardinal felt confident in his 
ability to end further quibbling by issuing a declaration, in March 
1730, making Unigenitus a law of church and state. Opposition within 
the parlement of Paris was fierce. The Jansenists, led by Pucelle, 
played on the Gallican and legal sensibilities of their colleagues to 
such good effect that the government was obliged to hold a bed of 
justice. It was a pyrrhic victory for the crown. An angry parlement, 
frightened that Fleury intended to remove its traditional right to hear 
appeals against convictions in the ecclesiastical courts, waged a bitter 
war against the bull's partisans in the episcopate. After two years of 
strife, Fleury struck out in August.1732, issuing a law restricting the 
parlement's right of remonstrance. The regent had employed a 
similar tactic in 1718, threatening the magistrates with a return to 
the draconian era of Louis XIV. Such a danger concentrated minds 
wonderfully, and in 1732, as in 1718, a compromise was reached that 
involved the suspension of the law. It was, however, a stark warning 
of the havoc religious controversy could wreak on the delicate 
relationship between the crown and the parlement. 
Thereafter calm was gradually restored. Fleury stuck fast to his 
policy of isolating the Jansenists and tried to avoid trouble in the 
parlement by evoking contentious cases to the royal council. He was 
helped by a radical offshoot of Jansenism, the convulsionary move- 
ment, which flowered in Paris after 1727. It emerged as the cult of a 
pious deacon, Franqois de Piris, whose tomb in the cemetery of Saint 
Midard became the setting for miracle cures and bizarre worship, 
featuring speaking in tongues and all manner of writhing and contor- 
tions. Hundreds of pilgrims flocked to the scene either to marvel or 
mock at these wondrous sights. Neither Fleury nor the ecclesiastical 
authorities had need of a Jansenist saint and they closed the cemetery. 
The parlement of Paris did contain a handful of disciples of Saint 
Midard, but the overwhelming majority was shocked and embar- 
rassed by the convulsionaries. This undoubtedly contributed to the 
less combative stance of the magistrates after 1732, and when Fleury 
died in 1743 there were good grounds for believing that the worst of 
the religious crisis had passed. 
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Louis 
To the dismay of the ambitious, Fleury's vigorous constitution 
enabled him to govern until he was well into his eighties. He carefully 
chaperoned the king, controlling access to his person and appointing 
a ministry loyal to himself. Aware that there was little chance of 
unseating the cardinal, the court cabals were rendered relatively 
powerless. Only towards the end of his life did he begin to lose his 
grip. When Charles V1 died in 1740, Fleury was personally inclined to 
honour the pragmatic sanction. His hopes of peace were dashed by 
the opportunistic Frederick I1 of Prussia, who brazenly seized the 
Austrian province of Silesia. With the Habsburg empire seemingly on 
the brink of partition, Fleury was unable to restrain the war party at 
Court, headed by the charismatic count de Belle-Isle, grandson of 
Louis XIV's disgraced minister, Fouquet. As French armies marched 
into Germany, they brought a quickening of the diplomatic and polit- 
ical tempo that symbolized the transition from the more leisurely 
pace of life under the cardinal. He died on 29 January 1743; France 
would learn to mourn his passing. 
With his mentor gone, Louis XV was finally, at the age of 32, 
obliged to quit the shadows and assume his mttier of king. His first, 
and in some ways most important, decision was whether or not to 
replace Fleury. He chose not to do so, and instead, following the 
precedent of 1661, announced that he would rule as his own first 
minister. Unfortunately, unlike Louis XIV or Frederick 11, Louis XV 
was not a young man impatient to exercise power. The king was 
intelligent and punctilious in his performance of his official duties 
and had a regal bearing that commanded immediate respect. He was 
not, however, a natural ruler. Instead he jealously guarded his own 
authority without bringing vision to government. Unwilling to trust 
his own ministers, he spent most of his personal reign directing a 
'secret' foreign policy at odds with official diplomacy. By turns 
fatalistic or authoritarian, he could strike out boldly one day, only 
to retreat in the face of opposition the next. No policy or minister 
could ever be considered secure and both the Court and the royal 
council were beset by intrigue. Senior ministers such as Machault 
d'Arnouville, d'Argenson, and Choiseul, to name but a few, were 
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disgraced and there were ten finance ministers between 1750 and 
1774. Perhaps the only point of stability was provided by the presence 
of Mme de Pompadour. Between 1745 and her death in 1764, this 
cultured and resilient woman was inseparable from the king. She 
dominated the distribution of court patronage and her political 
influence increased as the years progressed. Yet even Pompadour was 
only one powerful figure among many seeking to monopolize the 
confidence of the king. In such circumstances, stable government 
proved elusive and it is not surprising that perceptive observers 
dreamed of a return to the golden age of Fleury. 
In the early years of his personal reign, Louis.XV was shielded from 
the pitfalls of Versailles by the impact of war. Despite the perfidy of 
Frederick I1 and the attacks of the French and their allies, Maria 
Theresa refused to play the role of sacrificial lamb. Displaying great 
courage, she rallied her subjects, driving an audacious French force 
led by Belle-Isle from Prague in 1742. He saved his army with a bril- 
liant tactical retreat, but his hopes of delivering a mortal blow to 
Habsburg power were dashed. Yet despite Britain entering the conflict 
on the side of Maria Theresa, the War of the Austrian Succession 
would bring glory to French arms and to Louis XV. Under the com- 
mand of marshal de Saxe, the French won a series of battles in the 
Low Countries. Brussels was taken in 1746 and Saxe was soon threat- 
ening the Dutch republic. Alarm bells rang in London as well as in 
Amsterdam, bringing their governments scurrying to the peace table 
at Aix-la-Chapelle. 
Louis XV shared in the triumphs of his great general. The king's 
first campaign was uneventful; his second, in 1744, almost ended in 
catastrophe. As he advanced eastwards to join his armies, he was 
stricken by a sudden and terrifying illness. For several days he lay on 
what all feared would be his deathbed at Metz. The panic that gripped 
France was only outweighed by the joy and relief that swept the 
kingdom when news of the king's recovery was made public. On a 
tide of euphoria, his subjects thanked God for saving their king who 
was now popularly acclaimed 'Louis the well-beloved' (bien-aimt). 
A year later, the king was crowned with the laurels of victory at 
Fontenoy. There Saxe achieved perhaps his greatest triumph defeating 
the British after a bloody and close run encounter. Despite coming 
under enemy fire, the king refused to leave the field and Voltaire and 
countless lesser bards sang the praises of the warrior king, who, as he 
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surveyed the human carnage of Fontenoy, exclaimed: 'see what such a 
victory costs, the blood of our enemies is always the blood of men, 
the true glory is to spare it.' 
These pacific sentiments were genuinely held and they counter the 
claims of critics like Choiseul that the king was heartless or cruel. 
When peace was signed at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, Louis XV was 
generous to the point of recklessness. To the amazement of Europe, 
he handed back his conquests in the Low Countries in return for 
French possessions lost to the British in North America. Gains in 
Nice and Savoy were also relinquished, and, to add insult to injury, 
he agreed to expel the immensely popular young pretender to the 
British throne, 'bqnie  prince Charlie', from France. His moderation 
contrasts sharply with the arrogance of Louis XIV and guaranteed 
that there would be no repetition of the great coalitions against 
France of 1688 to 1713. Yet to patriotic French opinion, it seemed as 
if blood and money had been sacrificed in vain. Nothing better 
captures the public mood of anger and resentment than police 
reports of children taunting each other with the rhyme 'you're as 
stupid as the peace'. 
The mid-century crisis 
Historians are forever on the lookout for turning points and water- 
sheds. If any year in the reign of Louis XV deserves such a label it is 
1748. A successful war had deflected attention from his conduct of 
government and that was about to change. Within only a few years, 
the king was being compared to the ineffectual Henri 111, and his 
government ridiculed for its incompetence and factionalism. 
The first sign of trouble to come was provided by the attempted 
reforms of the finance minister, Machault. In 1749 he decided to 
replace the wartime tenth with a new tax, the twentieth. It was a bold 
innovation, proposing not only to levy a new direct tax in peacetime, 
but also to include the hitherto exempt French church and relatively 
undertaxed nobility and pays d'e'tats. Fully implemented, the twen- 
tieth would mark a crucial step towards fiscal equality. Initially the 
omens were good. After making remonstrances the parlement of 
Paris registered the law without difficulty. The other parlements and 
the provincial estates also yielded, leaving the church alone in its 
opposition to Machault. 
With the lines between church and state so firmly drawn, Louis XV 
and his minister were in a potentially powerful position. A successful 
raid on the coffers of the church would have undoubtedly sweetened 
the otherwise bitter pill of new taxation for the population at large. 
The campaign to tax the clergy also attracted a broad coalition 
stretching from Voltaire and the anti-clerical philosophes, to those 
Gallicans and Jansenists in the parlement of Paris who were keen to 
curtail the privileges of the clergy. If the king had stood firm, it is 
nearly certain that ecclesiastical resistance would have been overcome 
and that his name would have joined the others in the pantheon of 
enlightened absolutists. Instead, Louis XV grappled with his usually 
elastic conscience before caving in to the remonstrances of the 
bishops and the devout party at court. The church thus preserved its 
fiscal privileges and a golden opportunity was lost. 
Had Louis XV's capitulation to the clergy over the twentieth been 
part of a broader strategy to preserve peace in the church it might 
have been comprehensible. Alas, the bishops who were so forceful in 
opposing Machault were simultaneously stirring the pot of religious 
controversy. The chief troublemaker was the new archbishop of Paris, 
Christophe de Beaumont, an implacable opponent of Jansenism 
devoid of any sense but that of his own righteousness. His appoint- 
ment to such a critical see would have been unthinkable under Fleury, 
and it was an early signal that the cardinal's adroit handling of 
religious affairs would not be matched by his successors. Together 
with other zealots, Beaumont began systematically to deprive the 
Jansenists of the sacraments on the controversial basis that submis- 
sion to Unigenitus was a 'rule of faith'. His favoured tool was the 
confession note, a certificate confirming that a penitent had been 
confessed by an authorized priest. Failure to produce a note was 
tantamount to admitting opposition to Unigenitus and resulted in a 
denial of the last rites. 
Words scarcely suffice to describe the horror of such a punishment 
for a devout catholic as it carried the risk of eternal damnation. Even 
condemned criminals were not denied the consolation of the sacra- 
ments, and the public was stunned to see elderly religious, many of 
whom were distinguished by their piety and good works, treated so 
harshly. An estimated io,ooo mourners attended the funeral of one 
victim, and public anger led the diarist Barbier to declare 'the major- 
ity of Paris . . . is Jansenist'.' Against all good sense, Beaumont had 
succeeded in reviving religious controversy and there was no Fleury 
to douse the flames. With his Court and council divided, Louis XV 
failed to provide the necessary leadership and even today it is impos- 
sible to be sure about his own view of Beaumont's actions. Nor was 
there anyone in the ministry to speak in his name. The result was drift 
and procrastination interspersed with fruitless efforts to negotiate a 
compromise. 
As this new wave of persecution broke, the Jansenists turned once 
more to the parlement for assistance. The magistrates were initially 
reluctant to become embroiled in the dispute. It was the failure of the 
crown to act that created a mood of frustration and ultimately 
anger. Moderate voices fell silent and the vacuum was filled by a 
small but highly effective Jansenist party. There were no more than 
twenty Jansenists in the parlement, but they included talented and 
hard-working young magistrates such as Chauvelin, Lambert 
and L'Averdy. They denounced cases of refused sacraments and urged 
the parlement to use its right to hear appeals against the decisions 
of the ecclesiastical courts. Between March 1752 and May 1753 alone 
twenty-two such cases from six different dioceses were investigated, 
and relations between the parlement and the episcopate became 
ever more strained. With both sides determined to uphold their 
corporate dignity, it proved impossible to isolate either Beaumont 
or his Jansenist opponents. 
Within less than a decade of Fleury's death, the fragile peace in the 
church had been shattered. When confronted by the sacraments cri- 
sis, Louis XV had tried desperately to avoid treading on clerical toes 
and had pursued the will-o'-the-wisp of a 'third way' that could unite 
moderates against the fanatics on both sides. As failure brought 
frustration, the king questioned the loyalty of those he termed 'the 
republicans' in the parlement. The crisis came to a head in May 1753 
when he refused to receive the so-called 'grand remonstrances' that 
combined a denunciation of the refusal of the sacraments with a 
forceful reassertion of the parlement's role as guardian of the funda- 
mental laws. In response, the magistrates went on strike before being 
exiled by their angry monarch. 
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Unfortunately for Louis XV, the parlement was exiled without any- 
one giving serious consideration to what might be put in its place, 
causing grumbling from Parisians about a government incapable of 
providing either 'bread or justice'. No less damaging was the effect on 
the provincial parlements which began to agitate on behalf of the 
exiles. Finally, the judges themselves, especially the Jansenists, spent 
their enforced leisure time studying French history and refining their 
constitutional arguments. They were ably assisted by the lawyers, 
most notably Le Paige, who published the highly influential Lettres 
historiques during the crisis. Revising arguments last seen during the 
Fronde and the religious wars of the sixteenth century, he argued that 
the parlement was the direct descendant of the national assemblies 
held by the Frankish kings. His work also contained the seeds of what, 
after 1755, became known as the 'union of classes', the theory that 
together the parlements formed the one and indivisible parlement of 
France. These ideas had their roots in some of the most troubled 
years in French history and their re-emergence during the peaceful 
reign of an adult king underlines the damage caused by Unigenitus. 
Exiling the parlement of Paris was therefore counter-productive. 
Negotiations for a recall began almost immediately, but, with both 
sides convinced that they were the injured party, more than a year 
elapsed before the magistrates were recalled. For once, Louis XV took 
the initiative, revealing his sadly under-utilized talent for government 
by personally drafting a new law of silence. Registered by the parle- 
ment in September 1754, it invited the magistrates to prevent disturb- 
ance of the religious peace which they took to mean the refusal of the 
sacraments. Louis XV demonstrated his new-found determination by 
exiling Beaumont, while simultaneously petitioning Benedict XIV for 
an encyclical clarifying the status of Unigenitus. 
It might therefore be assumed that the law of silence marked a 
turning point in Louis XV's treatment of the parlement. 
Unfortunately his policy had all the consistency of blancmange. In 
October 1755, the king backed a half-baked scheme of chancellor 
Lamoignon and the minister of war, count d'Argenson, to bolster the 
powers of the grand council. It was a deliberate challenge to the 
authority of the parlement which responded in November 1755 with 
some of the boldest remonstrances ever written. Explicitly using the 
language of the union of classes, the Parisian magistrates not only 
rallied the provincial parlements, but even dared to invite the princes 
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and the peers to join them in the defence of the fundamental laws. 
The affair was typical of government under Louis XV. Without 
planning or foresight, the government had picked an unnecessary 
fight with the parlement which then defended itself with forceful 
constitutional arguments. The government backed down in April 
1756, but the king soon paid the price for his error. War was declared 
against Great Britain in June, and when called upon to register a 
second twentieth to pay for the conflict the parlement resisted ten- 
aciously. A bed of justice was needed to impose the law, and omin- 
ously for the king the provincial parlements picked up the gauntlet, 
more than matching the resistance of the Parisians. 
To make matters worse, the hardline bishops had continued to 
order refusals of the sacraments despite having been exiled by the 
king. Louis XV pinned his hopes on the pope, whose encyclical, Ex 
Omnibus, appeared in the autumn of 1756. A moderate document, it 
restricted the refusal of the sacraments to notorious sinners. It is easy 
to imagine the anger of the king when a Jansenist magistrate per- 
suaded the parlement that the encyclical should be lacerated and 
burnt by the public executioner. Such an extreme response was a clear 
indication that the senior magistrates had lost control. Indeed they 
probably encouraged the king to resort to harsh measures. On 10 
December 1756 a law based on the encyclical together with a discip- 
linary edict was imposed at a bed of justice. That night the over- 
whelming majority of the magistrates resigned. Needless to say, the 
government had no contingency plan to fall back on. Instead it dug 
itself into a deeper hole by exiling sixteen supposed ringleaders of the 
opposition in January 1757. It was all to no avail. At war and in dire 
need of the parlement to bolster credit, the king reversed his policy in 
September of that year. Cases of refused sacraments continued until 
the end of the reign, but the parlement was in future allowed to 
pursue those responsible. The magistrates had triumphed and the 
heat generated by the Unigenitus controversy finally began to cool. 
A decade of conflict had taken the shine off public perceptions of 
Louis XV. Ministers and policies came and went with alarming regu- 
larity and they inspired neither confidence nor respect from the 
kingdom's elites. No less disturbing was the loss of public esteem for 
the king, who became the butt of popular insults, placards, and 
graffiti-some of it regicidal in tone. Yet despite the disenchantment, 
France was still not prepared for the shock of 5 January 1757. Amidst 
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the turmoil of the political crisis provoked by the bed of justice of the 
previous December, Damiens, a deranged domestic servant, tried to 
assassinate the king. Louis XV only received a minor wound and his 
life was never in danger. It was, nevertheless, a rude awakening for the 
kingdom, conjuring up folk memories of civil war and briefly fanning 
the embers of affection for Louis the well-beloved. The king himself 
was plunged into melancholy, lying listlessly in his bed even when 
encouraged to leave it by his surgeons. When told that his wound was 
not serious he replied, 'it is more than you think, because it goes to 
the heart'.' 
The diplomatic revolution 
The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle failed to resolve the underlying causes 
of conflict between France and Great Britain in North America. To 
protect their thinly populated possessions, the French authorities 
began to construct a line of fortifications connected by regular 
patrols. Skirmishes between rival forces were an almost inevitable 
result, most famously in 1754 when a group of colonists led by George 
Washington killed an unarmed French officer as he approached to 
negotiate. Louis XV genuinely wished to avoid war. All the pacific 
sentiments in the world were not, however, going to halt the British. 
They sent an army under general Braddock to attack the French 
forts in 1755, and ordered their navy to block French reinforcements 
reaching Canada. The belligerent intentions of perfidious Albion 
were illustrated by the affair of the Alcide and the Lys. The two 
French warships were seized after coming under fire within seconds 
of being informed by British officers that the two nations were at 
peace! Satisfaction was, however, obtained against Braddock. In a 
perfectly executed ambush, French troops destroyed the enemy army, 
slaying the British general in the process. 
It was not until June 1756 that Louis XV officially declared war on 
Britain. Responsibility for the conflict lay in London, but with Europe 
at peace there was every reason to believe that France could hold her 
' L. Dussieiu and E. Soulie (eds.), Mkmoires du duc de Luynes sur la cour de Louis XK 
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own overseas. Confirmation of the theory was apparently provided 
by marshal de Richelieu's brilliant victory at Mahon, which saw the 
capture of strategically important Menorca. The British admiral 
Byng, who failed to relieve his compatriots, was court martialled and 
shot, as Voltaire cuttingly observed, 'to encourage the others'. Hopes 
were high that the British government would suffer a similar fate. 
It was not to be. Instead a war that had begun so promisingly 
would finish in defeat, thanks, in large measure, to the diplomatic 
revolution. 
If the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle resembled no more than a truce in 
North America, much the same could be said of its effects in central 
Europe. Maria Theresa was determined to recapture Silesia and 
together with her chancellor, Kaunitz, had conceived a daring strat- 
egy. They proposed nothing less than a complete realignment of the 
diplomatic constellation by allying with France against Prussia. The 
not unreasonable assumption behind their thinking was that the two 
great continental powers would easily crush the upstart Frederick 11. 
What persuaded Louis XV to accept the Austrian embrace was the 
duplicity of the Prussian king, who, without warning, abandoned his 
former ally by signing the treaty of Westminster with Britain in Janu- 
ary 1756. Understandably piqued, Louis XV agreed to a defensive 
alliance with Vienna in May. The French public was astounded. Few 
could understand why the king had allied himself to the Habsburgs, 
the sworn enemies of France since the time of cardinal de Richelieu. 
Yet with war against Britain certain, Louis XV clearly believed that 
the alliance would guarantee peace in Europe. Who would dare to 
attack such a militarily formidable coalition? The king's error was to 
overlook the intensity of Austrian ambitions to reclaim Silesia. 
Kaunitz wanted war, and was busily seeking to add Russia to a grand 
alliance against Frederick 11. The Prussian king was not easily duped, 
and, disastrously for Louis XV, he decided that attack was the best 
form of defence. His forces marched into Saxony in August 1756, 
unleashing the Seven Years War in the process. Within just four 
months of signing a treaty that he believed would preserve peace, 
Louis XV faced the nightmare of fighting a world war on two fronts, 
obliged to pay for the naval and colonial conflict against Britain, 
while simultaneously sending armies and subsidies into Germany. 
The Seven Years War 
Initially the war went well for France, and Richelieu followed up his 
triumph in Menorca'by defeating the British in Hanover. With the 
great Saxe dead, successful generals were at a premium, but Richelieu 
soon fell foul of Court intrigue and was relieved of his command. His 
fate was typical of French military appointments during the war, 
which depended on connections at Versailles rather than experience 
in the field. Never was the truth of this maxim revealed more clearly 
than on 5 November 1757. A French army, commanded by the prince 
de Soubise, a particularly close crony of the king and Mme de 
Pompadour, was routed by Frederick 11's much smaller force at 
Rosbach. French armies had been defeated many times before, but 
Rosbach was different. With nearly io,ooo killed, wounded, or taken 
prisoner, as against only 500 official Prussian casualties, it was 
humiliation on a grand scale. For the first time since 1643, when the 
Great Conde broke the Spanish veterans at Rocroi, France was no 
longer the continent's foremost military power. 
Nor would the shame of Rosbach be easily avenged. The demoral- 
ized French suffered further defeats at Krefeld (1758) and Minden 
(1759) and were a pale shadow of the force led so gallantly by Saxe. 
Frederick 11, on the other hand, withstood the onslaught of France's 
allies, Austria and Russia, displaying a combination of military genius 
and luck which earned him the title 'great'. When peace was signed in 
Germany in 1763, Silesia was definitively his. Tellingly, Frederick I1 
was a hero in France! 
Praise of the Prussian king was a thinly disguised rebuke for Louis 
XV, who made no repeat of his campaigns of the 1740s. His only 
sorties were into the forests of Versailles where, his critics alleged, 'he 
made war on stags'. To the pain of defeat, Louis XV added the shame 
of dishonour. With the connivance of Mme de Pompadour, the 
king spent even more time in the company of a string of young 
mistresses housed in the parc aux cerfs. It was conduct becoming of 
an aristocratic rake, not 'his most Christian majesty', and, in official 
pronouncements, the proud title of well-beloved rang increasingly 
hollow. 
Defeat in Germany was accompanied by spectacular losses overseas. 
Once the British had recovered from their early setbacks, they were 
able to capitalize upon their naval superiority and France's distrac- 
tions in Europe. The French coast was blockaded and in the major sea 
battles of Lagos and Quiberon (1759) Louis XV's fleet was destroyed. 
Starved of reinforcements and supplies, French forces in Canada were 
gradually overwhelmed. One by one, the Ohio forts, Louisbourg, and 
Cape Breton fell and in 1759 Quebec was taken. It spelled the end for 
New France because in 1763, unlike 1748, there would be no territorial 
gains in Europe to barter for losses overseas. Nor was North America 
the end of this tale of woe. The nascent French empire in India was 
lost, and possessions in West Africa and the Caribbean seized. When 
peace came in 1763, it closed one of the most disastrous chapters in 
French military history. 
The parlements: the enemy within? 
Wars, especially unsuccessful ones, are notoriously expensive. By 1763, 
the French national debt stood at some 2,200 million livres, a figure 
comparable to that of 1715. Massive borrowing had been accompanied 
by a sharp rise in taxation. A second twentieth had been levied in 1756 
and a third in 1760, while the capitation had been doubled in 1760. 
Indirect taxes had also proliferated, and, with no glorious feats of 
arms to ease the burden, it had become increasingly difficult to per- 
suade the parlements to register fiscal edicts. Opposition in Paris had 
fanned out to the provinces with the parlements of Besan~on, Dijon, 
Rennes, and Rouen amongst the more vociferous. Radical remon- 
strances, judicial strikes, and the exile of judges became common- 
place. Self-interest played a part in motivating their opposition. Yet, 
despite their faults, the parlements also sought to articulate public 
grievances and probably saved the government from more damaging 
unrest in the process. 
Louis XV was frequently angered by the resistance of the parle- 
ments. The failure of hardline policies in 1753 and 1756 had, however, 
taught him the virtue of caution. He was therefore willing to allow 
cardinal de Bernis, author of the recall of the parlement of Paris in 
September 1757, to pursue more conciliatory tactics. He worked 
closely with the parlement, dispensing patronage to its members and 
seeking to defuse potential disputes before they became public 
crises in a manner reminiscent of Fleury. His disgrace in October 
1758 produced many glum faces on the benches of the parlement, 
although any despair was premature. His replacement, the duke de 
Choiseul, shared the same general principles and until his fall in 
1770 the Parisian magistrates enjoyed a complex relationship with the 
government that, at times, bordered on partnership. 
Choiseul was an aristocratic freethinker whose skilful diplomacy 
secured better terms for the king at the peace of 1763 than he had the 
right to expect. In addition to preserving the Austrian alliance, he 
forged a solid Bourbon 'family compact' with Spain and oversaw the 
conquest of Corsica in 1769. The duke also turned his energy and 
talents towards the reconstruction of French military power with the 
aim of fighting a war of revenge against Britain. Under his guidance, 
much-needed military reform was begun and the navy was rebuilt, 
making possible the triumphs of the war of American Independence. 
To achieve his goals he needed money, and the duke concluded that 
more would be forthcoming from a policy of cooperation with the 
parlements. The most dramatic illustration of his approach was pro- 
vided by the fate of the Jesuits. With the covert backing of Choiseul, 
who was anxious to court the fiercely anti- Jesuit Charles I11 of Spain, 
the Jansenist party in the parlement of Paris orchestrated a campaign 
that resulted in the expulsion of the religious order from France. 
The devout party at Court, led by the dauphin, and the clerical estab- 
lishment was horrified. Yet it was noticeable that from April 1761, 
when the Jansenist magistrate Chauvelin first denounced the Jesuits, 
until the end of the Seven Years War, the parlement made no more 
remonstrances to the king. 
Peace, as we have seen, brought a huge financial hangover. The 
finance minister, Bertin, was obliged to maintain high rates of tax- 
ation which he threatened to make more onerous by ordering a land 
survey designed to ensure that the twentieth was levied accurately. 
Howls of protest from the parlements indicated that he had struck 
a privileged nerve. Resistance was particularly fierce in Rouen, 
Toulouse, and Grenoble where there were attempts to arrest the 
military commanders bearing Bertin's orders. With its popularity 
and credit in tatters, the government capitulated and Louis XV 
transferred Bertin to other duties. Choiseul, aided and abetted by 
Pompadour, chose his replacement, the Parisian magistrate, LYAverdy. 
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The duke took a certain cynical delight in placing a parlementaire 
in charge of the treasury, but it was an intelligent tactic. L'Averdy 
brought integrity and goodwill to the office and quickly defused the 
crisis with the parlements. Although the land survey was abandoned, 
his ministry was more than just a capitulation to vested interests. He 
sought to reform the taille, reduce interest rates, and to work closely 
with the parlement. He did not solve the financial crisis, but the 
presence of a man universally recognized for his probity did revive 
confidence in the crown. L'Averdy was also prepared to listen to new 
ideas. In 1764, he was responsible for the first steps towards freeing the 
grain trade, a move that liberal economists hoped would stimulate 
notoriously backward French agriculture. No less daring was his 
reform of municipal government where venality was abolished in 
favour of elected officials. These measures pointed in the direction of 
the reforms of both the next reign and the Revolution, but as so often 
before they proved vulnerable once their author fell from office. 
L'Averdy was disgraced in 1768, and within four years his policies 
had been reversed. For reform measures to reach fruition required 
governmental stability, and that Louis XV was unable to provide 
The Brittany affair 
L'Averdy's appointment had been accompanied by that of Renk de 
Maupeou as keeper of the seals and his son Renk-Nicolas as first 
president of the parlement of Paris. Such a combination suggested 
that misunderstandings and conflicts with the magistrates would be a 
thing of the past. What wrecked these calculations was the refusal of 
the provincial parlements to do as they were told. The parlement of 
Rennes was amongst the most turbulent, becoming locked in a bitter 
controversy with the local military commander, the duke d'Aiguillon, 
about both taxation and local administration. In the summer of 1765, 
the magistrates pushed their resistance to the limit by resigning. 
Urged on by d'Aiguillon the government struck back, establishing a 
new parlement manned by his supporters and clients. 
What turned a provincial crisis into one of the most damaging 
political scandals in French history was the arrest of d'Aiguillon's 
sworn enemy, the distinguished Breton magistrate and minor 
218 1 JULIAN SWANN 
philosophe, La Chalotais. During the summer of 1765, the secretary 
of state, Saint-Florentin, who was d'Aiguillon's uncle, received a 
series of anonymous notes insulting the king. The minister claimed 
to recognize the writing of La Chalotais, who was arrested and 
imprisoned. Over the next twelve months, he was subjected to what 
can be best described as a thoroughly incompetent show trial. Worse 
still, when the case against him collapsed he was sent into exile, where 
he remained until Louis XV's death. 
La Chalotais might well be described as Louis XV's Fouquet, the 
subject of a vindictive punishment out of keeping with the king's 
normally mild character. It may be, however, that the possible 
involvement of La Chalotais in an intrigue over letters written by a 
former royal mistress was what outraged the king. Yet by 1765, it was 
no longer possible to lock away a national figure on the basis of royal 
whim, and the La Chalotais affair became a cause dlkbre which split 
French elites in much the same way as the Dreyfus case would do 
more than a century later. Incensed by the government's flouting of 
basic legal principles, the parlement of Paris, seconded by the provin- 
cial courts, condemned royal policy in a flood of remonstrances. For 
the timorous, it seemed as if the union of classes had finally become a 
reality, and it determined the king to attend the parlement on 3 
March 1766 to issue a stinging rebuke. In majestic tones he restated 
the basic principles of his own absolute authority, and no history of 
eighteenth-century France is complete without a reference to what 
contemporaries called the 'flagellation' of the parlement. In political 
terms, however, it was a one-day wonder. The parlements were not 
silenced and the case against La Chalotais collapsed. Nor did the 
remodelled parlement of Rennes survive. Its old members returned 
in triumph in 1769 within months of d'Aiguillon resigning from his 
post as military commander. 
What stopped the Brittany affair from being just another failed 
attempt to weaken the parlements was the exile of La Chalotais. His 
colleagues refused to be silenced and blamed dYAiguillon for his harsh 
treatment. The duke was a haughty and authoritarian man, con- 
vinced that he had followed the king's instructions to the letter. 
Determined to be publicly exonerated, he demanded satisfaction 
from the parlement of Paris, sitting as the court of peers. His decision 
would spark one revolution and prepare the ground for a second. 
Maupeou's revolution 
D'Aiguillon's willingness to stand trial derived, in part, from his 
growing political credit. His burning ambition was to replace 
Choiseul in the ministry and the bitter rivalry between the two men 
and their factions was the principal preoccupation of Versailles. In 
the struggle for the king's ear, d'Aiguillon and his uncle,~ichelieu, 
adopted a classic strategy. They employed the charms of a beautiful 
courtesan to capture the credit and affection of the king. The ruse 
worked admirably and she was installed at Versailles in March 1769 
with the title of Mme du Barry. Remarkably the devout party wel- 
comed her arrival on the basis that God 'permits one evil to cure a 
greater one': meaning the ministry of Choiseul. They blamed him 
for the expulsion of the Jesuits and for royal weakness relative to the 
parlements. Yet d'Aiguillon and his allies would be disappointed. 
Du Barry lacked Pompadour's wit and ambition and her political 
influence was slight. 
Choiseul had no sooner weathered one storm than he was con- 
fronted by another. In 1768, Maupeou the younger replaced his father 
as chancellor. Ambitious and tactless, he was soon at war with 
Choiseul, who scored a spectacular own goal by allowing his rival 
to choose a new finance minister in December 1769. The chancellor 
recruited Terray, a long-time ally in the parlement of Paris. No less 
ruthless than his benefactor, Terray surmounted a severe financial 
and economic crisis in February and March 1770 by implementing a 
partial bankruptcy. Opposition was muted because informed opinion 
realized that he had little choice. In justifying his policies to Louis XV, 
however, he took every opportunity to criticize the excessive military 
spending of Choiseul. 
When d'Aiguillon's trial began in March 1770, therefore, both the 
Court and the ministry were riven by personal and factional feuds. 
Both Maupeou and Choiseul stood to gain if his reputation was 
tarnished and they almost certainly encouraged the parlement with 
that aim. Fearing conviction, d'Aiguillon used his influence with 
Louis XV to halt the trial in June and to issue letters patent clearing 
Quoted in Duc de Castries, La du Barry (Paris, 1986), 73. 
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his name. As chancellor it was Maupeou who had to justify the sud- 
den change of policy, and he was accused of acting arbitrarily. Despite 
a lifetime spent in the parlement and the prestige of his office, the 
chancellor had few friends amongst his former colleagues. Nor was 
he temperamentally inclined to compromise. Instead he sought to 
bully the magistrates into submission. When harsh words failed, 
he resorted to authoritarian methods, holding a bed of justice in 
December 1770 to impose a disciplinary edict that combined the 
rhetoric of the flagellation speech with restrictions on the parle- 
ment's rights of remonstrance. The magistrates refused to be intirni- 
dated and began a judicial strike. Many hoped that their resistance 
would topple the chancellor, but his position was strengthened by the 
disgrace of Choiseul on 24 December. He had incurred the king's 
wrath for risking war with Britain in defence of Spanish claims to the 
Falkland Islands. With the treasury bare, war would have been sui- 
cidal and Louis XV was spurred into action. Choiseul was dismissed 
and anxious letters were despatched to Madrid calming the bellicose 
Charles 111. 
With Choiseul gone, the devout party was in the ascendant and 
d'Aiguillon's appointment to the ministry imminent. Hated by the 
magistrates and isolated at court, Maupeou had little room for 
manceuvre. It came as no surprise when the magistrates were exiled 
on 20 January 1771, but the resemblance to previous crises ended 
there. 
Maupeou was an accidental revolutionary, but he was also a 
dynamic and resourceful one. The parlement of Paris was remodelled 
and venality abolished, although new magistrates were still appointed 
to their posts for life. Henceforth they were to be paid a salary, 
replacing the much criticized system of e'pices whereby judges 
received payments directly from litigants. The vast jurisdiction of the 
parlement was reduced and new courts created in towns such as 
Lyon, Poitiers, and Clermont Ferrand making justice more accessible 
to the people. The magistrates were still allowed to make remon- 
strances, albeit with the restrictions imposed in December 1770. 
When the provincial parlements protested, they too felt the heavy 
hand of the chancellor, who by the end of 1771 had effected what 
contemporaries christened 'Maupeou's revolution'. 
Despite their enlightened veneer, the reforms of in1 were hugely 
unpopular. For a generation weaned on Montesquieu's Spirit of the 
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Laws, the parlements were the intermediary powers which formed a 
barrier separating French monarchy from despotism. Maupeou was 
thus cast as the Turkish grand vizier, trampling French laws and 
liberties. Until his death in 1774, however, Louis XV supported the 
work of the chancellor. His actions should not be interpreted as a 
belated conversion to enlightened absolutism. The revolution of 1771 
was the result of a particularly virulent case of Court and ministerial 
infighting, the sort of squabbling that had undermined French gov- 
ernment since the death of Fleury. As so often before, the king had 
allowed a minister to take harsh measures against the magistrates and 
in Maupeou had found a man capable of making them stick. Yet the 
chancellor and his reforms were nevetsecure because an elderly royal 
leopard could not change his spots. There was always the possibility 
that a fresh upheaval at Court or a new political crisis would engulf 
the chancellor. Indeed in 1774 dJAiguillon, by now sitting in 
Choiseul's office as minister of war and foreign affairs, was plotting to 
overthrow Maupeou and recall the parlements. Nor was the public 
mood improved by the actions of Terray, who profited from the 
emasculation of the parlements to make the twentieth permanent 
and to collect other taxes more rigorously. By May 1774, royal finances 
were healthier than at any point for a generation, but the monarchy 
had rarely been more unpopular. 
Conclusion 
In May 1774, the still physically robust Louis XV contracted smallpox. 
Within a few days he was dead and like his great-grandfather before 
him was buried in haste to avoid unseemly celebrations. Yet the pass- 
ing of the years would not bring nostalgia for a 'golden age' of Louis 
the well-beloved. Despite possessing many of the qualities needed to 
govern, the king had reigned but never ruled. Drift, discord, and 
instability were the hallmarks of his government and often gifted 
ministers spent more time attacking each other than addressing the 
problems of state. Louis XV had also lost the affection of his subjects. 
This was more than just the result of his scandalous private 
behaviour. Shy and ill at ease in the company of strangers, he found it 
impossible to project a positive image of monarchy. During his reign, 
222 1 JULIAN SWANN 
Paris acquired many of the magnificent buildings and squares that 
adorn it today. French literature and art flourished and, although it 
was only dimly perceived by contemporaries, the kingdom enjoyed 
sustained economic and population growth. The tragedy of Louis XV 
was that he failed to associate himself with this positive picture. 
Instead, after 1748 he locked himself away in his royal palaces, ventur- 
ing only rarely to Paris and never to the provinces. Cut off from the 
public, Louis XV drained the well of affection for his person and 
encouraged the often exaggerated rumours about his conduct. The 
words of one disgruntled subject offer a sad epitaph for a reign of 
wasted opport~nities:~ 
Ami des propos libertins, You liked lewd talk, . 
Buveur fameux et roi cklkbre You loved your drink. 
Par la chasse et par les catins: A famous king-in hunting 
pink. 
Voila ton oraison funebre. Notorious in your taste for 
tarts: 
Obituarists need all their 
arts. 
Moufle d'hgerville, The Private Life of Louis XV Annotated and Amplified by 
Quotationsfrom Original and Unpublished Documents (London, 1924). Lines translated 
by William Doyle. 
